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Abstract: The Internet of Things is an emerging computing paradigm that promises to revolutionise society. The 
widespread capture and aggregation of data from sensors and smart devices combined with processing using 
machine learning in cloud computing platforms provides unrivalled insights into our environment. In addition 
to the numerous benefits (smart healthcare, cities, transportation, etc.) such insights potentially jeopardise the 
privacy of individuals, organisations, and society as whole. This is despite UK and EU regulations attempting 
to mitigate the risk of individuals’ data exposure and the impact of it on their security. To demonstrate the 
exploitation of metadata and its threat to privacy, this paper presents Meta-Blue, a Bluetooth Low Energy 
metadata capture, analysis, and visualisation tool. The results of a case study are combined with an overview 
of literature on IoT privacy to provide a holistic overview of the challenges and opportunities presented by 
IoT metadata.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has captured the 
attention of academics and industry alike. Businesses 
from start-ups to multinational enterprises are 
embracing and developing IoT devices and services. 
As these devices and services evolve, they generate, 
gather and analyse ever increasing quantities of data 
and metadata about their users. This revolution in data 
capture, coupled with the processing power of cloud 
computing and machine learning is enabling the 
realisation of highly proactive and reactive 
environments such as smart cities, autonomous 
vehicles and personalised health care. 
Debate continues around the definition of IoT. 
Whether IoT is a new paradigm or the evolution of 
embedded systems, wireless networks, artificial 
intelligence, data mining and other existing 
technologies is arguable.  Regardless of such debate, 
the market for IoT devices and services is exploding. 
Gartner predict the market will grow from 4.9 Billion 
devices to over 20 Billion devices by 2020 (Gartner, 
2017). In addition, there is exponential growth in the 
amount of data collected about users that is stored, 
analysed and traded by a range of services that make 
use of this technology.  
As with most large-scale systems, there is conflict 
between the requirements of the three main 
stakeholders in IoT; end users, governments, and 
service providers. All have very different 
perspectives and goals.  End users require their data 
to be secure and easily accessible via apps and web 
services. Governments also require security. 
However, there is increasing pressure to provide 
access to data by state agencies such as law 
enforcement, intelligence services, etc. which 
impacts the security of the wider public. Service 
providers seek to aggregate and monetise data while 
balancing user privacy with regulatory and legal 
compliance. Traditionally, metadata has been a grey 
area in these three perspectives whereby content, such 
as the text of an email, is separated from 
communications data, such as events in a network 
recording the sending of that email. 
However, the importance of metadata has 
increasingly been recognized in Europe, which was 
enshrined in law by the General Data Protection 
Regulations (GDPR) (European Parliament, 2016). 
These regulations impose responsibilities on 
collectors and processors of data, including metadata, 
to ensure transparency, proportionality, and 
appropriateness of data collection. Moreover, GDPR 
also ensures that data collectors and processors ensure 
the security of any personal identifying data that they 
store. In addition to the legal requirements, the 
diversity of technology utilised by IoT complicates 
matters further. 
The importance of the IoT paradigm should not be 
underestimated, nor should the potential for security 
and privacy challenges and benefits in this emerging 
domain. This article considers issues regarding 
security of IoT in general and reviews the established 
and emerging protocols, infrastructure and services 
used in this domain. We also identify the security 
challenges and potential benefits of existing real-
world IoT systems to support our position through a 
novel case study. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
provides background on the IoT paradigm and 
considers the broader issues of metadata and privacy. 
Section 3 presents an overview of recent and 
emerging threats, challenges and opportunities 
affecting IoT devices. Section 4 presents Meta-Blue 
our tool for visualising Bluetooth Low Energy 
advertising packets; along with a case study to 
determine the prevalence of IoT devices that 
persistently broadcast uniquely identifiable metadata 
(allowing users to be tracked) and analysis of some 
popular fitness tracking devices. Finally, we make our 
conclusions and discuss future work. 
2 BACKGROUND 
Despite a large amount of literature surrounding IoT 
and the effort made to define it (Minerva et al, 2015), 
there is no singular, universal definition. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology have published 
a report on the Network of ‘Things’ (Voas, 2016) 
which encompasses the foundations of IoT: 
 IoT involves sensing, computing, communication 
and actuation; 
 Things can occur in physical space (e.g. people, 
vehicles, switches, smart devices, etc.) or virtual 
space (e.g., data streams, software, files, etc.); 
 There are five primitives that describe all aspects 
of IoT systems; Sensors, Aggregators, 
Communication Channels, External Utilities and 
Decision triggers. 
As we can see, these foundations are wide and 
varied, making it problematic to define security and 
privacy in this domain. Despite the legal changes in 
Europe and the UK, there is still no ‘silver bullet’ to 
address this problem. 
To develop an understanding of the importance of 
IoT, we must understand its characteristics. IoT 
systems are typically distributed and heterogenous. 
Much of the computational power used to aggregate, 
process and provide data to external utilities, such as 
other services or humans, resides in the core of the 
network in the form of cloud platforms. Towards the 
edge of the network, computational power drops off 
as we shift from intermediate aggregators, such as 
smart phones or local base stations, to low powered 
sensors with restricted memory. This facilitates the 
widespread distribution of sensors in an energy 
efficient manner. 
The three-tiered architecture proposed in IEEE 
P2413 (IEEE, 2015) encompasses these foundations 
and is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: IoT three-tiered architecture, IEEE P2413. 
As figure 1 demonstrates, there are three distinct 
layers with the Application layer accessing data from 
the Sensing layer via the Networking and Data 
Communications layer. The authors of (Minerva et al, 
2015) note that the definition of IoT varies amongst 
its various proponents and stakeholders. For this 
reason, we shall take an evidence-based approach to 
our analysis of IoT and use this analysis to provide 
context to the security challenges identified in IoT 
environments. 
IoT devices typically serve as data capture devices 
which send data to be aggregated and processed by a 
cloud service. The metadata associated with IoT 
devices has some similarities with conventional 
computing devices; for example, it may contain; IP 
address, UUID, MAC address, etc. These artefacts are 
used to enable connectivity between the IoT device, 
intermediate devices and cloud services.  
While not all of these characteristics are 
considered PII (Personally Identifiable Information) 
under GDPR legislation, the proposed European 
ePrivacy legislation (European Commission, 2017) 
directly targets communications metadata and non-
personal data. It is hoped that this ePrivacy legislation 
will bring about a change in the IoT market and 
enhance the privacy of IoT communications.  
Applications
Networking and Data 
Communications
Sensing
Whilst much concern in the media and wider 
literature has focused on user and data security, 
metadata provides a greater challenge. For example, 
users cannot access it without specialist equipment, 
software or knowledge and may not even be aware 
that it exists. If it is not open to the users, they may 
not understand where their data is ultimately collected 
and stored despite legal obligations to make this 
transparent. If they do not understand this, then there 
is very little awareness of how their data is being 
processed or mined for events, locations or relational 
information associated with their activities. 
In addition to metadata associated with 
applications, there is other metadata that is created 
due to the wide variety of protocols required for IoT 
communications over and above those used more 
generally in TCP/IP networking. Moreover, each step 
of data transfer from the device to its ultimate storage 
may add metadata, for example, MAC (Media Access 
Control) addresses, IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, 
UUID (Universal Unique Identifier), etc. 
Bluetooth Zigbee, Z-Ware, and WiFi facilitate 
short range low power communication for IoT 
devices and all make use of MAC addresses to 
uniquely identify devices. With the exception of 
Zigbee these addresses are 48 bits in length with the 
first 6 bits representing the vendor ID. Zigbee an 
802.11.4 standard protocol uses 64 bits for MAC 
addressing. MAC address randomisation is supported 
but not mandated by Bluetooth and WiFi, however it 
has been demonstrated that fingerprinting techniques 
that negate MAC address randomisation and facilitate 
the tracking of devices via alternative attributes used 
to create fingerprints (Vanhoef et al 2016). 
Bluetooth has developed over the years to enable 
a wide variety of features. As of 2017 Bluetooth Low 
Energy (BLE) (Bluetooth.com, 2019) is the dominant 
standard adopted by most Personal Fitness Tracking 
Devices (PFTDs). This subset of IoT devices is of 
interest as these devices are typically always on and 
attached to a human subject. Moreover, these devices 
are associated with highly sensitive data, such as 
health, temporal geo-location and pattern of life. 
Combined with communications protocols associated 
with BLE, unique personal identifying information is 
generated. 
Before considering the details and specification 
for BLE and the emerging Bluetooth Mesh standards, 
we must understand how PFTDs utilise BLE. Figure 
2 illustrates how PFTDs use BLE and are integrated 
into the IoT architecture. 
 
Figure 2: PFTD architecture. 
PFTDs are typically constrained devices. Their 
internal architecture consists of an embedded 
processor responsible for retrieving data such as step 
count, temperature and heart rate from sensors and 
placing it in a small onboard storage area. This 
memory is used to store data for approximately one 
week, depending on capabilities and Internet 
connectivity, to facilitate data collection whilst the 
device is disconnected from the network. To 
synchronise with the cloud service, the PFTD 
connects to a staging device, typically a smart phone 
or computer, using BLE to transfer data. This is in 
turn transferred from the staging device to the cloud 
service using cellular or TCP/IP networks for 
aggregation and processing. The staging device then 
retrieves the results from the aggregating and 
processing service to display the data in graphical or 
numerical format for the user to view. 
To facilitate an ad-hoc connection between the 
PFTD and a staging device, the BLE component(s) on 
the PFTD periodically broadcasts advertising 
packets. BLE advertising packets can contain various 
types of metadata including; Advertisement Address 
(often a MAC address), List of Services, Service 
Class UUID, Shortened Local Name, Complete Local 
Name and Custom Payload (e.g. Power Level). This 
metadata is used to enable staging devices to 
distinguish between devices in their vicinity and 
determine which one to listen to (Argenox, 2019). 
It is noted that many devices send advertising 
packets containing a static MAC address which is 
persistently used by the device (Hilts et al, 2016). 
This is despite BLE privacy features being introduced 
in version 4.0 and improved in version 4.2 of the 
Bluetooth protocol. Hilts et al used RaMBLE a 
Bluetooth advertisement packet sniffing tool created 
by Contextis (Contextis, 2019) to gather advertising 
packets from Bluetooth devices. To validate their 
findings we developed Meta-Blue, a Bluetooth 
sniffing tool using open source libraries. Details of 
the tool and case study can be found in section 4.  
3 PRESENCE METADATA 
CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS 
IoT provides an ever-increasing list of benefits to 
society. However, the rapid deployment of complex, 
heterogeneous, distributed IoT platforms has also 
brought with it a variety of challenges. In the race for 
market share, products have been created using the 
simple formula: take an existing appliance; add a 
network stack and embedded operating system; and 
connect it to the Internet for control by an application 
and/or service. There are some obvious caveats and 
flaws to this formula that have resulted in unforeseen 
consequences to the security of the devices, data 
privacy and the broader Internet. The authors of 
(Kambourakis, 2017), highlight this describing how 
the Mirai family of malware has infected vulnerable 
IoT devices causing unprecedented large scale, high 
intensity Denial of Services attacks against global 
Internet infrastructure, impacting not only on the end 
users of IoT devices but society as a whole. 
3.1 Threats and Challenges 
The data aggregated by fitness tracking platforms 
such as Strava, FitBit, Garmin, etc. is used to create a 
competitive online health social network. These 
networks focus on comparison of fitness data 
gathered from end user devices. Users of these social 
networks compare steps taken, calories burned, geo-
locations and times, to compete. Like conventional 
social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, the 
interactions between the physical and digital worlds 
have resulted in some unforeseen discoveries. 
For example, while analysing Strava’s global 
heatmap (Strava, 2018), security researcher Nathan 
Ruser identified the locations of secret military 
installations around the globe (Ruser, 2018). Ruser 
could infer the locations and layouts of these 
installations and the routes taken by front line combat 
troops on active service. This breach of operational 
security sent shockwaves throughout the military 
establishment. 
The Strava case study is a powerful reminder that 
malicious actors may seek to infer information from 
the data aggregated in the core of the network by the 
providers of IoT services. Our work focuses on covert 
data aggregation from devices at the edge of the 
network and aims to highlight some challenges and 
opportunities. Such data is routinely broadcast by 
millions of wearables and other IoT devices around 
the world every day. In addition to fitness trackers, 
BLE emissions from smart watches, glasses, 
headphones, vehicles, tags, children’s toys, etc. all 
contribute to these readily observable broadcasts to 
provide insights into our patterns of life (Craddock, 
2016). 
Metadata at the edge of the network potentially 
poses a broader threat to privacy than centralised 
aggregated datasets controlled by cloud services 
providers. Users of IoT devices e.g. fitness trackers, 
have consciously opted in to these services, the 
metadata is subject to terms of service, and a single 
entity is accountable for storage and access control. 
Metadata collection at the edge of the network 
indiscriminately and covertly captures data that can 
be used surveil individuals, recording and/or 
predicting their movements through pattern of life 
analysis. More insidiously, such data can contribute 
to mass surveillance of the public by unknown 
entities. 
It is important to consider that the data captured 
during our case study was from a single capture 
device at a fixed location. A much more sinister 
scenario exists when we contemplate the impact of an 
attack on a smart city in which many fixed and mobile 
devices could be compromised and used to track the 
movement of individuals across a large metropolitan 
area. 
Issoufaly and Tournoux, investigate the 
exploitation of a Botnet of Bluetooth Low Energy 
devices, for large scale individual tracking in BLEB 
(Issoufaly, 2017). 
Bluetooth Mesh (Bluetooth.com, 2017) is an 
emerging standard that enables Bluetooth devices to 
communicate with each other over a mesh network. 
This presents the opportunity for a bad actor to 
potentially create or infect an app and create a botnet 
of tracking nodes in the form of Bluetooth enabled 
mobile phones to geo-locate individuals across a 
broad area via BLE advertisement packets. 
As will be demonstrated in the case study section 
of this paper, many of the threats and challenges 
highlighted in this sub-section are feasible and the 
tools required to implement such attacks are readily 
available in the public domain. 
3.2 Benefits and Opportunities 
The previous sub-section focused on the privacy 
challenges arising from the use of IoT devices. In this 
sub-section, we consider the safety and security 
benefits that IoT devices can provide. It is outside the 
scope of this paper to discuss the moral, ethical or 
legal issues that the following raise should they be 
implemented. 
An obvious benefit of using and identifying 
presence metadata is in the area of disaster recovery. 
For example, this data could be used to identify and 
recover individuals who are trapped by serious 
environmental hazards, such as buildings destroyed 
by earthquakes or floods. In addition, it could be used 
to help co-ordinate the emergency services.    
With a potential range of 100m, it is possible to 
detect the presence of devices at a not insignificant 
distance for asset recovery. When searching for the 
proceeds of acquisitive crime, the presence of 
multiple stolen devices in a single location may be 
used to identify stolen assets. This approach could be 
enhanced by either embedding battery powered BLE 
chips into high value items or keeping a registry of 
stolen device MAC addresses. This would facilitate a 
targeted search for such devices by law enforcement. 
Kao et al proposed an asset tracking system that 
utilises Bluetooth Low Energy and WiFi (Kao, 2017) 
to assist users tracking assets in large buildings. 
Following the 2016 terror attack in Manchester, 
many children were left unaccounted for as they were 
evacuated from the scene of the attack. IoT devices 
could be used for the identification of missing 
children or vulnerable adults. By simply recording the 
MAC address of the devices the children were 
carrying (PFTDs, mobile phones, etc.) it would have 
been possible to locate them by issuing simple 
instructions to the many hotels that had provided 
accommodation. This approach could be further 
enhanced through the implementation of a Smart City 
sensor grid or Bluetooth Mesh application that 
responds to missing children reports in a similar way 
to the US Amber Alert system. Identification 
information could be obfuscated to preserve the 
privacy of missing individuals once they have been 
recovered. 
Many serious offenders on licence are required by 
law to wear a tag to enable the enforcement of 
curfews and tracking of their location. IoT devices 
could aid offender probation compliance checks. 
Given the range of Bluetooth devices, it would be 
possible to install BLE tracking devices at the 
entrance of schools to enable staff to be alerted in real 
time to the presence of a sex offender and take 
appropriate action. 
Roadside capture of advertising packets could be 
used to ascertain the congestion levels of a route. 
Such data could be aggregated and combined with 
existing road sensors to better measure the traffic at 
key junctions or intersections. This data could be sent 
to the emergency services to improve emergency 
response times. Transport for London carried out a 
similar trial using Wi-Fi to measure foot traffic across 
various routes on the London underground (TfL, 
2017). 
Lin et al proposed the use of Bluetooth low energy 
tags to track dementia patients and keep them safe 
(Lin, 2015). 
It is noted that like many tools and techniques in 
cyber security, what can be used for good can also be 
subverted for malicious purposes. Therefore, careful 
consideration would need to be made about 
implementation of the examples above. The use of 
ephemeral keys and end to end encryption in the 
broadcast of hashed device identities and encrypted 
device locations is used by some mobile device 
tracking systems (Apple, 2020) to facilitate recovery 
of devices while preventing unauthorised tracking. 
Such an approach may be adapted to facilitate the 
tracking of individuals in the scenarios previously 
described. 
4 META-BLUE CASE STUDY 
This section demonstrates the extent to which PFTDs 
advertising broadcasts may be employed to identify 
individuals through presence metadata. The case 
study captured and collated advertising packets from 
BLE devices to determine if it is feasible to identify 
an individual device over a sustained period. 
To capture BLE advertising packets and validate 
the results we developed Meta-Blue (Meta-Blue 
2019), and licenced it freely under GNU 2.0 with the 
hope that other academics and researchers will use it 
help spread awareness on IoT security and privacy 
issues. Meta-Blue uses the open source library 
pyBluez (pyBluez, 2015) based on the Bluez 
Bluetooth official Linux Bluetooth implementation 
(Bluez, 2019). The tool captures and stores MAC 
addresses from BLE advertising packets. The stored 
MAC addresses are processed and visualised using 
the MatPlotlib library (MatPlotLib, 2019) and 
illustrated in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: BLE device visualisation. 
The plots in Figure 3 visualise the total number of 
devices visible for each iteration of the scan, and the 
device identification numbers associated with each 
device where device IDs are derived from MAC 
addresses. The scan was captured at the beginning of 
a lecture session and more than 25 unique devices 
where recorded over the duration of the capture. Even 
without the context being supplied it is evident that 
many devices arrived in the location in a short period 
of time and could be individually identified. 
In order to replicate this first experiment in a 
public setting, scans were conducted at a railway 
station. This is a more likely scenario whereby 
individuals were not known to the researchers. The 
plots in Figure 4 illustrate the arrival and departure of 
trains at a major UK railway station in Manchester. 
Over 400 unique devices where recorded over a 10-
minute time period. 
 
Figure 4: Train arrival and departure visualised with Meta-
Blue. 
From the capture alone, figure 4 demonstrates that 
it is possible to infer the arrival and departure of 
individuals by train, as indicated by the peaks and 
toughs in upper graph (indicating the number of 
devices visible at each time segment), and addition or 
reduction of coloured markers in the lower graph that 
represent individual devices. For example, between 
100 and 200 seconds in the capture, train arrival is 
marked by an increase in total devices, and the 
emergence then disappearance of device ID’s in the 
250 to 300 range, illustrating the transit of 50 
devices/individuals past the capture device in the 
busy railway station. Nearly 500 devices were 
observed in the 10 minute (600 second) capture, 
illustrating the popularity of BLE devices. 
To better understand the circumstances under 
which BLE devices persistently broadcast static 
metadata a separate visualisation was created using 
Meta-Blue and control devices. Figure 5 illustrates 
the results of this experiment. 
 
Figure 5: Control device visualisation with Meta-Blue. 
Two control PFTDs were monitored for a fixed 
period of time. Each of the devices was periodically 
connected to its staging device, a mobile phone, to 
synchronise data. The first control device with ID 1 
persistently broadcast its MAC address regardless of 
its connection with the staging device. The second 
control device with ID’s 3, 6, 8 broadcast different 
ID’s each time it was connected and disconnected 
from its staging device, demonstrating adherence to 
the Bluetooth LE Privacy standard. Devices ID’s 2, 4, 
5, 7, 9, 10, 11 belong to unknown devices transiting 
the vicinity of the experiment (demonstrating the 
prevalence of BLE devices). It may be the case that 
device ID’s 2 and 11 related to the same device, 
however this could not be confirmed as these 
broadcasts were not from the control devices. Both of 
the control devices where periodically monitored 
using Meta-Blue and RaMBLE (Contextis, 2019) 
over a period of months. Despite power cycling and 
battery depletion, device ID 1 never changed the 
MAC address that was persistently used and 
broadcast for months. It is clear from the data in 
Figure 4, and through other evidence gathered using 
Meta-Blue and RaMBLE (Contextis, 2019), that 
many devices opt to broadcast persistent MAC 
addresses. 
As demonstrated by this case study, it is possible 
to identify unique devices through presence metadata. 
This could be further exploited to impact an 
individual’s security and privacy by correlating this 
metadata with other data. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
BLE devices present a number of privacy and security 
issues, both of which are at the heart of recently 
proposed EU regulatory control. First and foremost, 
devices are powered on by default and often cannot 
be turned off. As such, most users are unlikely to be 
aware of the advertising packets frequently broadcast 
by their devices and their ability to identify individual 
devices. This data can be used to identify personal 
identifying information, particularly when correlated 
with other data. In addition, users may not know 
whether high standards in data encryption are being 
employed by the device’s software or turned on at all. 
Moreover, in many cases it is unclear as to how or 
where the data is stored, or the level of encryption 
and/or anonymization applied to discrete or 
aggregated data stored in the cloud by the provider. 
This goes against the transparency required by 
regulatory bodies and may have serious implications 
for controllers and processors of such data. 
It is important that when considering any of the 
scenarios discussed in this paper that MAC address 
collisions can occur. While they are rare, they could 
have a significant impact in some use cases. As such, 
when employed in cases where identification of an 
individual device has significant consequences, a 
secondary check should be carried out to validate the 
presence of a device or individual. This will be 
addressed in future work. 
The emergence of a Bluetooth Mesh standard will 
enable existing BLE devices to communicate via a 
mesh thereby significantly increasing the range at 
which a device can be detected. This has implications 
for both the security challenges and benefits 
considered in this paper. Further research is also 
required to determine the consequences of the 
Bluetooth Mesh standard. As with the BLE standard 
the way manufacturers implement the new standard 
will play a key role in determining the privacy and 
security of users. In addition to the privacy risks 
outlined in this paper, the IoT poses a large threat to 
societal privacy and trust. A much broader range of 
threats to privacy are emerging as IoT matures; to 
give a single example; private corporations are 
constructing large scale unregulated surveillance 
networks, marketed as a feature of smart connected 
door bells. Aside from the recent attacks on these 
devices and potential for them to disrupt the Internet 
through Mirai type attacks. The threat to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 12 
(United Nations, 1948) the right to privacy, by private 
corporations with global reach demonstrates that 
further regulation or enforcement of existing 
legislation is required to balance the interests of the 
market and the privacy of the individual.  
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